Abstract This paper explores whether the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a flexibility mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, has contributed to poverty alleviation in countries that host CDM projects. We argue that the CDM should deliver pro-poor benefits to the communities in which projects are established, since poverty alleviation is integral to sustainable development, which is one of the main purposes of the CDM. After briefly discussing the background of the CDM, we discuss assessment difficulties to which research is prone when evaluating CDM projects for alleged sustainable development contributions. Section 4 brings together and analyses available empirical research on the pro-poor benefits the CDM purportedly delivers to host country communities, concluding that the CDM has failed to deliver poverty alleviation. Therefore, without attempting to be exhaustive, we suggest policy reforms that aim to redirect the CDM to those most in need of assistance.
Introduction
The UN's Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) affirms that 'responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated manner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts on the latter, taking into full account the legitimate priority needs of the developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty' (UN 1992: 3) . Furthermore, the UNFCCC states that economic and social development and poverty eradication 'are the first and overriding priorities' of the developing countries Parties under the Framework Convention (UN 1992: 8) . Of particular relevance in this regard is the inequity inherent to climate change: although the poorest of the world are only responsible for a small part of the emissions that contribute to climate change, they will suffer most of the consequences (McMichael 2013) . Although climate change threatens all countries, developing countries are likely to bear 75 % of the costs (Hoornweg et al. 2010: 4) , while in the last decade, Asia, the Americas and Africa have already suffered most from natural disasters (Guha-Sapir et al. 2012: 29) . In the light of the predicament of the global worst-off as regards climate change, as well as the pledges made under the Kyoto Protocol (KP), a justice-based analysis of the CDM as the policy tool par excellence that aims to address development and mitigation is warranted.
One of the international economic policy tools in operation to tackle climate change is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) defined by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) (UN 1998) . Its purpose is twofold: (1) to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development (SD) and (2) to assist developed countries in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments (UN 1998: 11, Article 12) . Hence, although the CDM has no defined mission of delivering pro-poor benefits, it does have the purpose of assisting developing countries in achieving SD, to which poverty reduction is integral. When examining methodological literature on SD, Olsen (2007: 62) indeed finds that there seems to be a consensus that SD encompasses at least three dimensions: social, economic and environment, with the social dimension including poverty alleviation and equity as general criteria. Furthermore, eradicating extreme poverty is the first of the Millennium Development Goals, put in place to achieve human development. It is argued that the latter should include SD since human development is inevitably flawed if it does not ensure that future generations can live fulfilling, healthy and educated lives (Peeters et al. 2013) . Indeed, human development without SD cannot be true human development (Neumayer 2010: 1; 2013: 562; Griggs et al. 2013: 306) .
Furthermore, existing and prominent definitions of SD indicate that poverty reduction is integral to SD. The Brundtland Report states that 'development that is sustainable has to address the problem of the large number of people who live in absolute poverty' (WCED 1987) . The Rio Declaration considers eradicating poverty as an 'indispensable requirement for sustainable development' (UNCED 1992a: Principle 5), and Agenda 21-a voluntary implemented UN action plan-states that 'a specific anti-poverty strategy is therefore one of the basic conditions for ensuring sustainable development' (UNCED 1992b: Chapter 3). The stance of both Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration was reaffirmed at the RIO ? 20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 (UN 2012) . More specifically related to a market-based mechanism such as the CDM, the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the UN following the RIO ? 20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development stated: 'we consider green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication as one of the important tools available for achieving sustainable development' (UN 2012: 10) . In sum, on a theoretical macro-level, SD is considered to be a multidimensional ethical concept that implies an inter-and intra-generationally just development (Drupp 2011 (Drupp : 1214 . Hence, in this paper, we argue that the CDM, with its goal of helping developing countries achieve SD, should at least deliver a minimum of pro-poor benefits to the communities in which projects are established.
In the following section, we will briefly sketch the background of the CDM. Subsequently, in the third section, we will discuss some of the assessment difficulties that researchers are confronted with and which make it arduous to evaluate the CDM. In Sect. 4, we bring together and analyse available empirical research, concluding that the CDM has had limited or no effect in terms of poverty alleviation and sustainable development in host country communities. In the final section, without attempting to be exhaustive, we list several propositions that, in our view, will make the CDM prioritise poverty alleviation by offering pro-poor benefits to the communities in which CDM projects are established.
Background to the Clean Development Mechanism
The CDM is a market-based offsetting mechanism. When countries (under the KP) or companies (under the EU Emissions Trading System or EU ETS) invest in emissions saving projects in developing countries, the equivalent of the saved emissions results in CDM credits, or Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) that project investors can trade or use to comply with mitigation pledges (European Parliament and the Council of the EU 2003). Article 12 of the KP provides that the proceeds from certified project activities are to be used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing countries to meet the costs of adaptation (UN 1998). Furthermore, CDM projects are to deliver SD benefits as defined by the host country (see also Sect. 3).
Initially, the CDM was hailed as a 'win-win' strategy since it would help developed countries to comply with mitigation targets while simultaneously directing monetaryclimate adaptation-flows from north to south. Nevertheless, even though the number of projects has increased steadily over the years, with currently 7595 CDM project activities being registered, 1 the future of the CDM looks grim due to current developments in international climate governance. The KP's first compliance period ended in 2012, and although a temporary successor was installed, entitled the Kyoto Protocol Second Commitment Period (KPII), the effort is negligible in the light of the 2015 negotiations in Paris. Because it omits the USA and Canada and demands no binding reduction pledges from the emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India, KPII countries now merely account for 15 % of global emissions (Grubb 2013: 282) .
Hence, demand for CERs will only be powered by the EU ETS and the Australian emissions trading system, and CER prices keep track of the currently low EU ETS entitlement prices (Grubb 2013: 281) . The future of the Australian emissions trading system, however, is unclear since the recently elected Prime Minister of Australia, Tony Abbott, is a well-known opponent of emissions trading (Murphy 2013) . Furthermore, the EU ETS is experiencing hardship: because its installations are holding a vast number of surplus entitlements, demand for CERs has decreased and prices have dropped dramatically, currently hovering around €0.40/tCO 2 -eq. In addition, the Council of Europe (2014) has accepted a 40 % emissions abatement target by 2030. Although the European Commission's (2014) proposition to the Parliament and the Council intended for the emission reductions to be achieved through domestic cuts only, thereby eliminating the frontloading of international credits on the European carbon market, the Council's 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework makes no mention of the Commission's proposition (Council of Europe 2014) .
Nevertheless, since the CDM and other offsetting mechanisms are installed to facilitate developed countries to reach their emission reduction targets, it is politically realistic to assume that, when a new emissions abatement treaty is put into effect in 2020, the use of offsetting mechanisms will be high on the agenda again. Furthermore, since the start of the Chinese emissions trading system, a Chinese domestic offsetting mechanism has been introduced which could help ease pressure on the CDM and lift prices in the international offset market, which is supplied mainly by the CDM (Chen and Reklev 2014) . Moreover, countries hesitant to take domestic action will rely on international offsetting to meet their-sometimes self-imposedemission reduction targets. Australia, for instance, has announced that it will meet its emission reduction targets of 5 % below 2000 levels, by 2020, by allowing 45 % of abatement to be delivered through international flexibility mechanisms (World Bank 2014).
The Clean Development Mechanism and sustainable development
As mentioned, the first goal of the CDM is to assist developing countries reach SD. However, evaluating whether the CDM contributes to achieving SD, and poverty reduction in particular, remains arduous since such an evaluation can only be based upon the Project Design Documents (PDDs) as a primary source of information. Evaluations can thus only be made for projects' claimed intentions in project documentation since no ex post verification is made of the ex ante sustainability claims made by the project developer (Crowe 2013: 63; du Monceau and Brohé 2011: 10; UNFCCC 2012: 7) . Hence, there is no follow-up over time by a governmental Designated National Authority (a national authority that evaluates whether projects are eligible for approval) or a Designated Operational Entity (i.e. firms that validate PDDs against the CDM's modalities and procedures) to ensure that the claims in the PDD are applied in the project (du Monceau and Brohé 2011: 10) . In practice, this implies that the Designated National Authority evaluates PDDs against a set of pre-defined criteria, encompassing environmental and social aspects of sustainability (Boyd et al. 2009: 822; Olsen 2007: 62; Schneider and Grashof 2007: 4) . However, the SD criteria of many host countries lack transparency and clarity, with the criteria being rather vague, qualitative guidelines that leave too much room for interpretation (Nussbaumer 2009: 59; Sterk et al. 2009 ).
2 Furthermore, PDDs rarely contain quantifiable information related to SD (Crowe 2013: 64) . Indeed, some argue that whether or not a stringent evaluation takes place depends on the voluntary 'goodwill' of actors in the carbon audit network (Boyd and Goodman 2011) .
Moreover, the Marrakesh Agreements stipulate that, in the absence of an internationally accepted definition of SD, it is the host country's prerogative to define the criteria of SD (UNFCCC 2002 (UNFCCC , 2012 . Project developers thus have to navigate between varieties of CDM governance since national governments employ different criteria for SD and states have varying levels of capacity to process PDDs and to monitor project implementations (Fuhr and Lederer 2009; Newell and Bumpus 2012: 55) . The assessment of SD thus differs widely among host countries, and it is argued that no country requires the expected SD benefits-as described in the PDD-to be monitored as rigorously as the emission reductions (Drupp 2011 (Drupp : 1214 Capoor and Ambrosi 2009: 50; Newell et al. 2011 ). Although various countries place different emphases on different aspects of SD, the emphases do tend to be predominantly economic in nature (UNFCCC 2012: 19) . Leaving the task of defining SD to the host country has arguably resulted in the concept usually being interpreted as 'economic growth' Lloyd 2011: 1610) . Furthermore, the major CDM host countries (Brazil, India and China) have a lower SD profile when compared to countries with a smaller share in the CDM portfolio (Fenhann 2011; Killick 2012) . Research suggests that host country influence has a strong association with SD indicator scores, particularly for social indicators (Killick 2012: 21) .
Additionally, due to intense competition between developing countries to attract CDM projects and the fact that there are little or no price premiums to be gained from investing in projects with higher contributions to SD, the absence of international standards regarding SD results in a trade-off favouring the most cost-efficient emission reduction projects, with the envisaged SD opportunities taking a back seat to the emission reduction aspect (Alexeew et al. 2010; du Monceau and Brohé 2011: 4; Gillenwater and Seres 2011: 30; Martinez and Bowen 2013: 809) . This trade-off could lead to a race to the bottom in terms of SD standards, with host countries undercutting each other to attract CDM investment, thereby fundamentally weakening the SD objective (Alexeew et al. 2010; Crowe 2013: 67; Drupp 2011; Nussbaumer 2009 ).
3 Moreover, under the existing framework, neither host countries nor buying entities have a direct incentive to enforce high sustainability standards. Competition to provide 'easy and speedy approval' will most likely persist, creating a disincentive towards high sustainability standards (Olsen and Fenhann 2008: 2822; Sutter and Parreño 2007 ).
An extensive body of research indicates that the CDM has, so far, not fulfilled its objective of helping developing countries achieve SD since it does not contribute towards the host country's SD (Drupp 2011 (Drupp : 1214 Fuhr and Lederer 2009; Haya 2009; Lloyd and Subbarao 2009: 240; Wara 2007 Wara , 2008 . One of the key problems that remain is that SD benefits are generally not prized in the structure of the CDM market, which brings Olsen (2007: 59) to the conclusion that 'left to market forces, the CDM does not significantly contribute to sustainable development. ' In sum, the CDM stands in need of improvements regarding the uniformity of SD criteria together with an ex ante evaluation of the alleged SD benefits a project is to deliver. Furthermore, quality assurance regarding SD benefits should be provided, so that CDM projects make a genuine contribution to sustainable development. However, as research shows, in order for projects to make such a contribution, a common understanding of the definition of sustainable development is crucial. In Sect. 5, we will make a number of suggestions on how to improve the CDM, but we will first turn more specifically to the propoor benefits the CDM could deliver.
The Clean Development Mechanism and poverty alleviation
As argued in the previous section, the CDM appears to be more effective in reducing GHG emissions than in achieving SD. 4 Yet, concerning the emission reductions, the CDM is said to have been delivered, and several commentators claim that the CDM has failed, so far, to initiate carbon reductions in some sectors (most notably the forestry sector) and some regions (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) (Fuhr and Lederer 2009: 328) . Indeed, CDM projects are geographically unevenly spread. A mere 1.4 % of projects can be found in sub-Saharan Africa, while the bulk of projects is located in emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil (Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Das 2011: 8; UNFCCC 2012: 8) , with China hosting half of the world's CDM projects (Liu et al. 2013: 145) . Newell et al. (2011: 27) observe that carbon finance has tended to shadow flows of foreign direct investment to middle-income countries such as China and India, which together receive 70 % of CDM revenues.
From the above-mentioned definitions of SD, it should be clear that, on the macro-level, SD is clearly defined as an ethical concept which includes a concern for the worst-off and for future generations, and which makes explicit reference to poverty alleviation. In this light, the uneven spread of CDM projects is problematic: even though the pro-poor benefits that can be delivered in emerging economies should not be disregarded or disincentivized, the pursuit of SD requires that much more attention should be given to the poorest communities and regions.
Although the CDM has no defined mission of addressing poverty issues or delivering pro-poor benefits, since the mechanism was installed to help developing countries achieve SD, and since poverty alleviation is an integral part of SD, it can be argued that the CDM has the task to address poverty in its projects by guaranteeing that the projects deliver direct pro-poor benefits. The World Bank has observed that CDM projects 'could contribute significantly to improving the basic needs of people in poorer countries' (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009: 50) . Indeed, the National CDM Authority in India, the second largest CDM host country, states that when elaborating on the national sustainable development priorities, CDM activities should be oriented 'towards improving the quality of life of the very poor from the environmental standpoint' (Sirohi 2007: 92) .
Examples of such pro-poor benefits are as follows: inter alia, investments to decrease vulnerability to climate change events, to increase climate resilience (see, for example, Djanibekov et al. 2012; Tyler and Moench 2012) and improving rural access to affordable 'clean' energy. Indeed, access to clean and reliable energy can help improve standards of living and support sustainable livelihoods among rural and low-income urban populations (Newell et al. 2011) . Rural areas, particularly, are in need of renewable energy since the distribution of fossil fuel energy is expensive and challenging (Casillas and Kammen 2010: 1181; Newell et al. 2011; Sirohi 2007) . The limited physical access of rural households to electricity, as well as their low purchasing power, prevents them from having access to modern energy services. In 2010, 17 % of the global population did not have access to electricity, 85 % of which live in rural areas and 87 % in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia (World Bank/IEA 2013: 91) . Hence, projects focussing on a rural community level (Sirohi 2007) , and small-scale rural renewable energy projects in particular, seem to offer the best prospects for poverty alleviation under the CDM (Brunt and Knechtel 2005: 8; Lloyd and Subbarao 2009; Newell et al. 2011; Subbarao and Lloyd 2011 : 1601 -1602 . 5 Footnote 4 continued with the predicted emissions from the completed project. Carbon accountants calculate what the emission rates would have been if no investment had taken place. This process of determining the so-called additionality of a project is highly questionable (Haya 2009; Schneider 2011). This is even more the case if projects are initiated from the bottom up, with local people having vested interests in the project design and management (Boyd and Goodman 2011) . Nevertheless, small-scale renewable energy projects are rare in the CDM pipeline (Boyd et al. 2009: 822; Lloyd 2011: 1602) .
To complicate things even more, in 2002, only months after the Marrakesh Accords finalized the CDM rules, the opportunities for renewables were examined and it was argued that, where the CDM to be dominated by least-cost approaches, the scope for renewable energy projects would be seriously limited (Pearson 2007) . According to Pearson (2007: 249) , the problem with the renewable energy is that it requires more investment to produce carbon credits than most other available options. Since the allowance trade focuses solely on reducing a specific pollutant by an exact date and a precise amount, and does not prescribe a preferred way to reduce emissions, renewable energy initiatives, which tend to be expensive, are deemed less attractive.
6 When least-cost options dominate the CDM and SD benefits are not priced, the CDM will continue to be technology neutral and renewable energy will be frozen out of the market (Pearson 2007: 251) . Although renewable energy projects have received fewer funds, in 2009 they accounted for sixty per cent of the total number of CDM projects, while three quarters of carbon credits went to the elimination of industrial gases by large manufacturing firms (Newell et al. 2011: 27) .
On the basis of evaluations of the PDDs submitted in the context of the CDM, the UNFCCC has concluded that the most prominent benefits claimed by project developers are the stimulation of the local economy through employment creation and poverty alleviation, followed by pollution reduction and the promotion of renewable energy and energy access. Nevertheless, in all countries, social benefits tend to be cited less often than economic and environmental indicators in PDDs in all countries. Furthermore, stimulation of the local economy, which includes job creation and poverty alleviation, was only explicitly present in 31 % of the 2864 examined projects in 2011 (UNFCCC 2012: 19) .
Although there is a limited body of research focussing specifically on the pro-poor benefits delivered by CDM projects, the available findings seem to be in line with the UNFCCC's results. However, the studies that have examined the CDM linkage to poverty alleviation have primarily been country specific (see Sirohi 2007) , or have been limited in scope or in the number of projects analysed (see Rive and Rübbelke 2010; Sutter and Parreño 2007; Wood 2011) . Let us briefly discuss some of these researches' findings. Sirohi (2007: 105) has examined 65 PDDs for CDM projects in India, the second largest CDM host country, and found that, although India is one of the most attractive countries for project development, socio-economic development is not at the heart of these projects as described by the applicants. Although the CDM has undoubtedly delivered improvements in energy efficiency in industrial firms in India and has thereby decreased production costs, the benefits of projects focussing on energy efficiency in industry remain largely 'firm-specific' and are unlikely to have an impact on rural poverty. Sirohi concludes that the socio-economic development potential of CDM projects in India is doubtful and that the PDDs 'offer just lip service regarding expected contribution to socioeconomic development of the masses, particularly in rural areas' (Sirohi 2007: 104) .
In line with Sirohi's findings, on the basis of an analysis of 16 CDM projects, Sutter and Parreño (2007) have found that 23 % of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) stemming from the reviewed projects were owned by transnational private companies, with revenues flowing to people outside of the host country. A mere 0.3 % of revenues created by CERs were likely to flow to the poorer 50 % of the host country population (Sutter and Parreño 2007: 84) . As it seems unlikely that the benefits generated from these projects will 'trickle down' to reach the poor, these projects are unlikely to create any significant impact on the alleviation of rural poverty (Lloyd and Subbarao 2009: 242) . Subbarao and Lloyd (2011) have examined 500 registered small-scale CDM projects in the fields of employment, migration, access to electricity, health, the use of local resources, local environment and stakeholder perception. They found that CDM projects have generated: a highly beneficial impact on the utilization of local resources; a medium to high score for socio-economic and human development impacts; a low to medium beneficial impact on employment generation for the local community and region as well as stakeholder participation; low beneficial impacts on the local environment and community; a non-existent or very low level of beneficial impact on migration, community education, health and associated services, and electricity access; and a non-existent or very low beneficial impact on marginalized people in the community.
In a recent study, Crowe (2013) has examined 114 CDM projects for pro-poor benefits and found that 74 % of reviewed CDM projects delivered no pro-poor benefits at the local community level, indicating that the projects were not located in a high poverty area or that the documentation did not explicitly specify that the claimed benefits would be directed to the poor. Furthermore, 16 % of the examined projects delivered only weak pro-poor benefits and a mere 10 % of the projects were rated as 'moderate' or 'strong' (Crowe 2013: 66) .
In sum, the conclusion seems to be that the CDM has not yet produced substantial benefits regarding poverty alleviation. In its Fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC appears to share this view, stating that mitigation policies with social co-benefits expected in their design, such as CDM projects, have had a limited or no effect in terms of poverty alleviation and sustainable development (Olssen et al. 2014: 3) . Some commentators argue that the CDM institutionalizes and accentuates the processes of uneven development (Boyd and Goodman 2011; Boyd et al. 2009 ) and that the CDM has served to mirror or even reinforce inequities in flows of finance, both between and within countries. Despite efforts by, for example, the Chinese government to steer investors towards the poorest parts of the countries, the wealthier regions in all three major CDM host countries (Brazil, India and China) are more likely to attract CDM projects (Newell 2009: 432) .
In sum, it should be clear that the CDM is not supporting the social dimension of SD. The limited body of research available as yet indicates that the CDM has failed to deliver pro-poor benefits or poverty alleviation. In the following section, we will make a few proposals for addressing this lacuna.
Proposals for reform of the Clean Development Mechanism
Because the CDM in its current form is hardly able to fulfil its second goal, thereby failing those for whom the mechanism was founded, we would submit that emissions trading can be morally acceptable only if it either rejects the CDM altogether or if the CDM is radically reformed (see also Caney 2010: 218).
7 Adopting a political realist and pragmatic approach, we assume that the CDM is likely to remain an important policy tool of future climate governance. However, if it were to realize its goal of assisting the developing countries to move towards more SD, it would clearly be in urgent need of reforms. Therefore, without attempting to be exhaustive, this section will discuss some recommendations that would, in our view, help enable the CDM, or a future version of it, to fulfil that goal.
The CDM is ultimately a climate policy tool, rather than a mechanism specifically designed to drive development in low-and middle-income countries. However, since SD is widely considered to address human development, CDM projects should at least address poverty issues in the poverty struck environments in which the projects take place, in addition, to increasing the number of CDM projects being located in low-income countries. As we have tried to demonstrate earlier, the CDM is not fulfilling its SD goal; therefore, it might seem superfluous to point out that it fails to support the worst-off. The latter, however, need not be the case.
In Crowe's analysis of 114 CDM projects, 25 projects had a premium add-on standard such as the Gold Standard 8 or the Social Carbon methodology and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) (Crowe 2013 ). Crowe's results show that 64 % of the projects with add-on standards delivered pro-poor benefits, while 36 % did not, leading to the conclusion that projects with premium add-on standards may, overall, perform better than regular CDM projects in providing pro-poor benefits (Crowe 2013: 69) .
These add-on standards, or labelled projects, concern a stringent and transparent set of criteria with which project developers need to comply, thereby shaping and constituting the 'rules of the game' by which participants abide, for the standards provide incentives and disincentives to behave in particular ways (Newell 2009: 430) . Add-on standards are said to act as the best-practice benchmarks and try to establish a premium price for higher SD benefits. They are considered to incentivize project developers to consider SD benefits in depth, which is expected to lead to an increased share of CDM projects delivering better SD results.
Building on Nussbaumer's (2009 ) research, Drupp (2011 has found that when comparing Gold Standard projects with unlabelled CDM projects, Gold Standard projects outperform unlabelled CDM projects in delivering local SD benefits (such as air quality, water quality, regional economy and employment generation). While Nussbaumer (2009), 7 This is but one criterion for emissions trading to be morally acceptable. Elsewhere, we have argued that in order to comply with justice demands, emissions trading should be effective in reducing emissions and should distribute the burdens associated with mitigation activities equitably (reference blinded for peer review). 8 The Gold Standard, for example, was established in 2003 by a consortium of NGOs. The Gold Standard employs three 'screens': only renewable energy and energy efficient projects qualify for registration; the Gold Standard applies a conservative assessment of projects' additionality; every eligible project has to submit a 'sustainability matrix', i.e. a checklist approach through which a project developer needs to state what impacts the project will have on environmental, social and economic indicators (Drupp 2011; Wood 2011) . To obtain the Gold Standard, project developers need to answer eleven question concerning human development issues. These questions cover human rights, resettlement, removal of cultural heritage, freedom of association, compulsory labour, child labour, discrimination, healthy work environment, precautionary approach as regards to environmental challenges, degradation of critical natural habitats and corruption (Sterk et al. 2009: 7) . In addition, project developers submit a sustainability-monitoring plan that is used to verify ex post whether the project has indeed contributed to SD as assessed ex ante (Sterk et al. 2009: 16) . Research indicates that projects certified with the Gold Standard generally capture greater SD benefits than unlabelled CDM projects (i.e. projects without add-on standards) (Killick 2012: 21) . See also CDMGS (2015) . Nussbaumer's (2009: 91) conclusion that the Gold Standard seems to 'slightly outperform comparable projects, although not unequivocally', with Gold Standard projects slightly underperforming in micro-economic efficiency. In the light of the limited number of projects reviewed and the above-mentioned assessment difficulties, Drupp (2011 Drupp ( : 1223 warns that the comparison method only allows for a partial capture of the potential impacts in terms of local SD benefits. Furthermore, of the 142 listed Gold Standard projects, in 2010, only six were located in Africa, while the majority of projects were to be found in China, India and Thailand (Wood 2011: 13) . Africa, so it is argued, offers fewer cost-effective abatement opportunities, suffers from a poor investment climate and lacks awareness of the CDM (Wood 2011: 18) .
Since CDM projects are, as yet, seldom found among the poorest communities or regions, a regionally balanced growth of CDM projects needs to be incentivized. Hence, in the absence of private CDM projects in regions with a high poverty incidence, public sector entities should set up CDM projects in these areas, especially those pertaining to renewable energy and the agricultural sector (Newell et al. 2009: 9; Sirohi 2007: 106) . Moreover, certain project types (such as HFC gas projects) that are associated with low SD benefits should be excluded from the CDM projects (Drupp 2011; Pearson 2007; Olsen and Fenhann 2008) . In addition, Designated National Authorities and Designated Operational Entities should require project developers to present a clearer exposition of sustainability and development input of their projects and the criteria that host countries employ to evaluate whether a project may generate CERs should be tightened. Olsen and Fenhann (2008) , for example, propose to apply an international standard for sustainability assessment additional to national definitions. Alternatively, premium prices or add-on standard validation should be granted to CERs from CDM renewable energy projects located in regions with a high poverty incidence, which are able to demonstrate the desired SD input of their projects (Sirohi 2007: 106) .
Since, as mentioned earlier, CERs with add-on standards generally outperform conventional CERs in delivering pro-poor benefits, a tax could be raised on the trade of the latter, with revenues funding local development projects, in addition, to the 2 % that is currently levied on conventional CERs. Such a tax could be analogous to a Tobin tax (Ott and Sachs 2000: 19) . 9 The Chinese government, for example, raises taxes on industrial gas (hydrofluorocarbon, HFC) CDM projects with revenues flowing to a 'CDM Fund', which is supposed to finance renewable energy projects (Zhu 2013) . Taxing conventional CERs could possibly outbalance the surplus cost of CERs with add-on standards, which are generally sold at about 25 % above the market value of unlabelled CERs (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 97) .
In addition, propositions have been made to apply a discount rate to CERs (e.g. Alexeew et al. 2010: 246; Castro and Michaelowa 2010; Chung 2007; Lazarus et al. 2013: 13) . Discounting CDM emission reductions in the supply side means that not all reductions generated by a project enter the carbon market: for example, when an investment in a power plant has delivered a reduction of 10 tonnes of CO 2 , emission entitlements equivalent to only 8 tonnes will be handed out through CERs. Such proposals usually intend to ensure that the CDM delivers de facto emission reductions: part of the emission reduction is not used to offset emissions elsewhere, but to provide real global emission reductions (Castro and Michaelowa 2010: 5) . However, a discount rate can also be applied to discriminate against unlabelled CERs in favour of CERs with add-on standards. The latter would then be exempted from the discount rate, rendering them more attractive for investment. Applying the discount rate in such a manner can lead to surplus, or additional, emission reductions, and can be used as a means to account for any surplus reduction in a way that does not contribute to meeting an existing reduction pledge (Lazarus et al. 2013) . Furthermore, discounted CERs can be limited in time through shortened crediting periods.
In our view, discounting unlabelled CDM emission reductions could potentially redirect the mechanism towards the poorer developing countries, as discount rates can be tied to the level of development of the host country. For instance, in countries with high instances of poverty, CERs can be issued with a low or no discount rate attached. This could create an increased demand for CERs with add-on standards, which would result in a premium price for CERs from projects with a strong contribution to SD, which in turn might increase the share of these projects in the carbon market (Sutter and Parreño 2007: 89) . Discounting emission reductions in this way would be in line with the CDM objective of assisting developing countries in progressing towards SD.
A discount rate can also be tied to the level of development of the host country or even the host region, which would render the poorest countries or regions more attractive for investment. The lion's share of projects would then no longer be found in the three major host countries (i.e. Brazil, India and China), in which the projects hardly favour the worstoff (see Sect. 4 above), but rather in countries and regions where substantial gains in poverty reduction and sustainable development could be achieved. It might be argued that such a move would lessen the efficiency of the mechanism, yet efficiency is but one factor to be taken into consideration. Indeed, a trade-off between efficiency and poverty alleviation might persist under our proposition. However, since until now the CDM has clearly favoured its goal of helping industrialized countries meet their emissions quota, while underperforming in achieving its other goal of helping developing countries achieve sustainable development, reform should arguably tip the balance in favour of the latter. Furthermore, the increase in transaction costs need not result in a barrier to funding projects in underprivileged contexts: levying a tax according to the level of a country's or region's development could act precisely to attract investors to underprivileged regions. While an extra transaction cost might be considered to be less efficient, entities are always at liberty to purchase emission entitlements from the-even more expensive-domestic emissions trading systems, which are not subjected to the Kyoto Protocol supplementarity rule. The Kyoto Protocol states that international credits from flexibility mechanisms such as the CDM are supposed to be 'supplemental to domestic actions' (i.e. to deliver less than half of the emission reductions mandated by the Kyoto Protocol) in order to ensure that high polluting countries respect the UNFCCC's adage of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities'.
The proposition to tie add-on standards to a discount rate need not entail that entities will no longer fund projects in the emerging economies, which, as stated, are home to the vast majority of CDM projects. Under our proposition, the demand for international credits could increase: because the discount rate implies that fewer emissions can be offset for a single credit, entities will require more credits to compensate for their emissions. Such an increase in demand could have multiple effects. First, it could possibly affect the saturation of the EU's carbon market. Although the EU ETS is considered to be the flagship of emissions trading, its carbon market has been flooded with international credits to such an extent that in 2013 almost half of the surplus allowances on the EU carbon market were CDM CERs. When demand for international credits increases, this may affect the price and reduce the surplus of international credits on the EU carbon market. Second, if prices of international credits were to increase, the competitiveness of the emissions entitlements from domestic emissions trading systems would improve. To that effect, the price increase could make entities under the Kyoto Protocol II and EU ETS effectively abide by the supplementarity rule, as they would no longer have an incentive to comply with their emission targets through surrendering international credits. The latter disincentive applies not only to countries under the Kyoto Protocol II or members of the EU, but also to countries that have self-imposed targets, such as Australia. Should international credits become more expensive, domestic abatement might be regarded as more efficient and this could strongly encourage these countries to step up their efforts. Third, if a tax would be raised analogous to the Chinese tax on industrial gas CDM projects, and if demand for international credits would increase because of the discount rate tied to non-labelled CDM credits, the resulting revenues could fund poverty-alleviating initiatives when CDM projects fail to do so.
Since the Gold Standard focuses primarily on renewable energy and end-use energy efficiency projects (Sterk et al. 2009: 14) , Crowe suggests the development of a new and revised premium add-on standard which would incorporate a number of key characteristics, so as to offer a pathway to more CDM projects actualizing their potential to both deliver individual pro-poor benefits and to contribute to poverty alleviation. Such characteristics would include a focus on projects at the community and household level, located in least-developed countries and areas of high poverty (Crowe 2013: 76) . Indeed, without diverting resources from adaptation, this would provide an opportunity to synergize efforts to mitigate GHG emissions, to contribute to economic growth through clean development and to reduce poverty (Crowe 2013: 59) . Although initiatives like the Adaptation Fund (primarily financed from a share of the proceeds from CDM project activities) link adaptation with mitigation, a more direct avenue to provide pro-poor benefits to projects' host communities can be found by focussing on the characteristics and impacts of the CDM project activities (Crowe 2013: 59) .
A new add-on standard similar to the Gold Standard but with clear requirements towards delivering pro-poor benefits could require projects to take the interests of the local poor seriously by, inter alia, verifying ex post the ex ante claims made in the PDDs concerning possible local concerns/participation/benefits. For example, CDM host country, Peru, performs on-site visits to confirm projects' contributions to SD, instead of a deskbased assessment (Disch 2010) . Furthermore, stimulating projects that are initiated from the bottom up, with local people having vested interests in the project design and management, has proven to provide development benefits (Boyd and Goodman 2011) . Investors would then also benefit, for the financial risk would be reduced since the projects would enjoy local support and would thus avoid political opposition, legal action and local unrest (Streck 2004: 311-312; Newell et al. 2009: 15) . Admittedly, a new label or add-on standard could significantly increase the validation and verification costs (Gillenwater and Seres 2011) , but costs could be met with the revenues from the above-mentioned tax on non-labelled CDM projects.
The most fundamental CDM reform needed, however, is the development of more specific SD criteria. Currently, few procedures exist to ensure that projects produce social and environmental SD benefits (Gillenwater and Seres 2011: 30) . However, a clear and globally accepted definition of SD is unlikely to be politically feasible since host countries consider such a definition to be an infringement of their sovereignty (Olsen 2007: 61) . Nevertheless, we would argue that existing and prominent definitions of SD-such as those of the Rio Declaration (UNCED 1992a: Principle 3) and the Brundtland Commission (WCED 1987: 54) -can function as the guidelines to the development of SD criteria for CDM projects. The taxonomy of international SD standards developed by Olsen and Fenhann (2008) could provide a first step. Since, as they argue, there will never be one 'right' way to define SD, no single authoritative definition exists of how to formulate unambiguous criteria and indicators covering all aspects of sustainability. Therefore, they propose to use a conceptual framework taxonomy of indicators to be used in the PDDs, for measuring and monitoring SD benefits (Olsen and Fenhann 2008 : 2822 -2823 . However, as Killick (2012: 21) argues, this could lend a false sense of legitimacy to the CDM process, for such an approach could render SD criteria open to a multitude of interpretations.
In the absence of a national, regional or global agreement on what SD should include, entities such as the EU could introduce their own additional requirements for importing CERs into the EU ETS (Sterk et al. 2009: 23) or, alternatively, they could further limit the quantity of CERs a party can use (Caney 2010: 218) . As regards the environmental dimension of SD, the EU, for example, has decided to prohibit the use of CERs from certain industrial gases (HFC-23 and N 2 O from acid production) as of 2013 and intends to move from CDM towards sectoral crediting, particularly in energy-intensive sectors. The UK government has recently announced that it will no longer issue Letters of Approval (LoA) for CDM projects involving fossil fuel power plants (DECC 2013) . Moreover, the EU plans to focus on CDM activity in least-developed countries (Erickson and Lazarus 2011: 2) and has declared that the environmental integrity of the CDM should be improved. In addition to such restrictions, governments could demand qualitative and quantitative indicators concerning the pro-poor benefits CDM projects are to deliver.
Last but not least, a 'grievance mechanism' should be built-in during the implementation phase of projects. If valid grievances are not addressed appropriately or if the quality of the CERs cannot be assured, the project should no longer receive CERs or should lose its add-on standard qualification (Sterk 2011) . When groups of countries start demanding the application of additional sets of modalities and procedures for importing CERs into their emissions trading systems, CERs with add-on standards delivering pro-poor benefits and intensive stakeholder consultation will become increasingly appealing.
Concluding remarks
The Kyoto Protocol's CDM was designed to help developed countries comply with their mitigation targets, while at the same time helping developing countries reach sustainable development (SD). Although a rather extensive body of research has investigated whether the CDM has helped developing countries achieve SD, fairly little attention has been paid to the question whether the CDM delivers pro-poor benefits. Since it is widely held that poverty alleviation is an integral part of SD, we have looked at the findings of the limited body of available research scrutinizing whether the CDM has delivered pro-poor benefits as part of its SD goal. We conclude that the CDM in its current form appears to have only done so to a small extent and is thus in urgent need of reform. We have discussed a number or proposals for reform that aim to redirect the CDM to those most in need of assistance.
